A Review of Theory of Ludwig Wittgenstein: Distinguish between Language of Religion and Science

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ABSTRACT

Wittgenstein is one of the small numbers of twentieth-century philosophers who is well known outside philosophical circles. This may be due to his exceptional life and personality and the number of biographies and memoirs written about him. However, it is also because his writing has the power to interest the non-specialist reader in a way that other works of philosophy do not. In this article we decided to statement Early Wittgenstein with Picture Theory of Meaning and Later Wittgenstein with Language Games Theory. For example in Language Games Theory, Due to the importance of language games here from the perspective of Wittgenstein The meaning of words attain through usage in verbal and nonverbal vase. Then we will explain Aspects of the problem of philosophy Wittgenstein and specially interpret the difference between Language of Religion and Science. The Most Important his Ideas are about Family Resemblance and Private Language Distinction between Religion and Science. In this article we will try to explain these theories.

Key words: Language, Religion, Science, Language Games, Ludwig Wittgenstein.
INTRODUCTION

It is important to know that the family is very effective in forming the identity of a person. Such as all, Wittgenstein is not an exception of the story. As it is written in the encyclopedia of philosophy.

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein, (1889-1951) was born in Vienna, the youngest of eight children. Ludwig paternal grandfather, a convert from Judaism to Protestantism, had been a wool merchant in Saxony before moving to Vienna. Ludwig father, Karl Wittgenstein, had, as a strong-willed boy, rebelled against a classical education, running away to America when he was 17. After two years he returned to Vienna and underwent a brief training in engineering. ... Ludwig mother was a Roman Catholic and Ludwig baptized in the Catholic Church(Malcolm, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Wittgenstein 1967).

And then about his education Malcolm adds that he:

...was educated at home until 14. ... His parents decided to send him to a school at Linz...; after three years at Linz ...

He was sent for two years in Berlin. Then, he went to England and continued his studies in engineering; but after three years he shifted again to the mathematics and then to the philosophical foundations of mathematics. But under Russell’s supervision he engaged in logic which led to his logical and philosophical life and was an introduction for writing the Tractatus, the most important book in his first season of life. (We can call this season as first Wittgenstein)

After Russell, he was greatly stimulated by G. E. Moore in two areas:

His attempts to reply to skeptical arguments by asserting things he took it to be plain that he knew (for example that Earth had existed for a long time.) and by Moore's discussion of the paradoxical character of saying 'I believe he has gone out, but he has not.'(Diamond 2006).

Later he wrote On Certainty and he tried to criticize Moore's view in epistemology especially his theory which is famous by the name Commonsense.

In the twentieth century, surely we can count him one of the greatest philosophers in the west. After Kant, he could turn philosophy historically from epistemological issues to the new area of analytical and linguistic issues. Connection of the philosophy and language –and also philosophy of religion and language as a result- opened a new window for improving the situation of philosophy in this century. About his philosophy, Pears says:

Wittgenstein's philosophy is a strange product of genius, which differs in many ways from the work of his contemporaries and predecessors.(Pears 1971).

One of the particularities of his philosophy refers to the division between two seasons of his life. He, in fact we can say, was two distinguished philosopher because of his two divided era of philosophical life. David Pears holds:

The most striking thing about his achievement is that he produced two different philosophies, one in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus... and other in Philosophical investigations.(Pears 1971).

Firstly, Tractatus, which is a short and précised book, was published in a German journal and then it published as the two-language book –German and English- with the introduction of Russell in England in 1922. In the second era of
his philosophical thinking, he wrote Philosophical investigations in 1949 and two years after the death of Wittgenstein, it was published the copy of this book in English in 1953. The main part of this book is in critique of Tractatus. In the Philosophical investigations he replaced his picture theory of meaning to the theory of function and usage of language. As Wittgenstein holds:

But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question and command? There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", and "sentences". (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 1973, 23)

Thus in the Philosophical investigations he asserted on the function and usage of language. (McGinn 2004). But despite of this replacing, he had believed to the symmetry of the two books. The last book of him is called On Certainty that contains his last epistemological view. (Mahdavi Nejad 2005).

The Early Wittgenstein: Picture Theory of Meaning

In the first book of Wittgenstein –Tractatus- there is a different theory from the last view of him. One of the beginning claims of him is that there is a challenge for solving the philosophical problems with the classical methods.

These philosophical problems are solved by a critique of language which fixes the limits of factual discourse. (Pears 1971).

Thus his goal in this theory is to show that we can solve the problems of philosophy with a correct and true understanding of language and its function. If we find the logic of our language, then we can understand the problems of philosophy. See )Grayling 2009, 35-6( as Malcolm holds:

It –Tractatus- presents an original and comprehensive theory of the nature of the language, of the nature of thought and of the nature of reality. (Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View 1993).

The main issue of Tractatus is that what is the structure of language? What is its relationship with outside world and how it is possible to picture it? Wittgenstein tries to understand the structure of reality with understanding the structure of language. Thus his attitude in Tractatus is the attitude of formal language. For explaining this standpoint, he faces to the theory of logical atomism. And then based on this theory, he introduces picture theory of meaning. In his view, language is a logical picture of reality. In the other word, language is a picture that can represent the reality.

In his view, the unit that can mean is the proposition and the meaningful proposition is a proposition that can portrait the reality of things, but it is not necessarily true. If we find for this picture that is made by the proposition an extension and instance, than it will be true and otherwise it is false. He explains:

The thought is a proposition with a sense.(Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 1989).

And then he adds

A proposition is a picture of reality. (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 1989)

In fact there can be different forms of propositions which can show different forms of reality. He explains:
My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition. That is to say, in giving the nature of all facts, whose picture the proposition is. (Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916 1979).

In this regard, his thinking in Tractatus is that language is a compound of propositions which are the picture of reality of the world, but the world is not only limited and pictured in the language; it embraces the painting, photo, the geographical plan and even a note or a part of music. See (Mahdavi Nejad 2005).

Then he tries to present a mechanism for the propositions and dividing between atomic and compound propositions and also the relationship between them and real which have in correspondence one by one. In some points he is similar to Russell. But for him the meaningful proposition is a truth-function proposition and metaphysical propositions and even mathematical propositions are pseudo statements or they are tautology. He says:

Mathematics is a logical method. The propositions of mathematics are equations, and therefore pseudo propositions. (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 1989).

A proposition of mathematics does not express a thought. (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 1989).

So in his view, all metaphysical statements – in both cases of tautology and pseudo propositions- are meaningless. The point that later on has gotten the main belief of Vienna circle, because of that in the first sentence of Tractatus he asserts that:

The world is all that is the case. (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 1989).

There is a one by one correspondence between the logical elements of a sentence and the elements of real things and the names of things are representation of things. But in the third statement of Tractatus he explains that "the logical picture of real facts is a thought." But there are three structures in relation with each other: 1. the status of things and facts in the world, are a structure of simple things; 2. A thought is a structure of mental elements; 3. A linguistic proposition, is a structure of signs. Only when these three structures are in harmony, we can say a proposition is true. There are three parallel structures in three different areas –the area of reality, the area of thinking and the area of language-. Thus a thought is a picture and a picture is a model of reality. As Malcolm holds, there is an important point about the relationship between these three structures is that:

An important feature of the notion of picturing is that a picture and what is depicts must have the same number of elements. 'in a proposition there must be exactly as much to be distinguished as in the situation that it presents. The two must possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity.' (T, 4.04) ((Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View 1993).

As it was mentioned, metaphysical propositions –in the view of early Wittgenstein- are meaningless, because the only criteria of being meaningful is having extension in the outward and real world; in this situation, its contradictory, also, will be meaningful. But in the both contradictory situations, for metaphysical proposition, we have to be silent. In his view, either language speaks about facts clearly, or it should be silent, because its duty is only explaining the facts. The limitation of language is the reason of limitation of the world, because there are many things in the world that cannot be contained in the frame of the language. (Pears 1971) All issues about metaphysics, life, regarded to God, morality, aesthetics and religion are meta-language. These things can be shown, but cannot be explained all of them belong to the mystical realm.
There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical. (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 1989).

In this sense, Wittgenstein ends Tractatus by this sentence:

What we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence. (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 1989).

This sentence was very interesting for the Vienna circle. But it seems they interpreted his view in order that he was not satisfied. In fact by the word meaningless, he does not want to reject the mentioned issues, but he wants to sheer the direction of them from knowledge to the faith–like Kant. In his view, these issues are placed in the category of mystical experiences. As Gillies says:

Wittgenstein’s attitudes were somewhat different from dose of Carnap and most of other members of the Vienna circle. Wittgenstein, certainly, as we have seen, held the view that metaphysics was meaningless. He was, however, a man of strong religious leanings, even though not a member of any organized religion; and in the Tractatus he developed a theory of mystical. The key point here is that, for Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, the limits of what can be meaningfully said do not coincide with the limits of what can be thought. On the contrary, there are things which cannot be said, but which can none the less be shown or thought or which make themselves manifest. Such things constitute the mystical. As Wittgenstein himself puts it in the preface to the Tractatus:

Thus the aim of the book is to set a limit to thought…. (Gillies, Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century: Four Central Themes 1993).

For supporting this view, he gives the example of life. We can proceed and find the meaning of life in the mystical experience, but we cannot show and purports it to others by the words. See (Gillies, Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century: Four Central Themes 2002).

However because it is not the final work of Wittgenstein and after a while he started to critique himself and began to introduce a new system of philosophy – and also a new point view of relationship between mentioned things such as religion with science- we don’t proceed and critique his early view, and we shift to the later Wittgenstein which has more importance in the history of philosophy and more effective.

**Language Games Theory; Later Wittgenstein**

In the third decade of twentieth century, Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language changed from picture theory of meaning to the applied theory of meaning and then to the theory of language games. This thought revolution started by writing the book philosophical investigations which become famous after his death. In this era, the contrary and in critique of first theory that he was asserting to the explaining the real by language, he asserts that the meaning of a word is the usage of that word in the language. He explains:

For a large class of cases – though not for all- in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 1973).

When he starts this book, by criticizing the Austin’s concept of language, tacitly he criticizes his first view which is in Tractatus. In the beginning of philosophical investigations, after quoting a paragraph of Confession of Austin, he explains:
These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name object – sentences are combinations of such names- in this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 1973).

In this regard, the language is a combination of distinguished words that finds its inner coherency from a social institution’s frame. We can use the words in a widespread and heterogeneous usage of different goals and because of that the duty of philosophy is not only logical analysis, but its duty is to explaining the different frames of language that he calls them language games. When he names this term, he means that the usage and trueness of meaning of words has its special norms of itself, and if we use them in another norm, there will happen the mistake in the meaning.

But these games are not arbitrary phenomena, and they happen because of the diversity in the interests and wishes of human. These different interests are the causation of many different institutions. The institution of science and also the institution of religion are such these social institutions. Moreover, it is not necessary to indicate the rules of the games and for finding these rules, it should see exactly in the quality of the usage of language in its natural place. This natural place can be called as form of life and it indicates to the point that a person cannot understand the correct usage of language except after using language in its proper interest and after cooperating in using some significant concepts.

In his view, understanding the meaning of a word depends on its various usages. A word can be explained by its usage, like an instrument that can be explained by its usage. He indicates:

Think of words as instruments characterized by their use, and then think of the use of a hammer, the use of a chisel, the use of a square, of a glue pot, and of the glue,(Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books 1958).

This example, clearly, shows the diversity of goals in using words and the unlimited usage of them. Also there is not one function that is unit and similar for all words and propositions. Thus, in his view, language, for him is a collection of instruments which is used for different goals. Language has different games which each of them are independent in to its area. These different language games, in his view, can be listed as:

Giving orders, and obeying them;
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements;
Constructing an object from a description;
Reporting an event;
Speculating about an event;
Forming and testing a hypothesis;
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams;
Making up a story and reading it;
Play-acting;
Singing catches;
Guessing riddles;
Making a joke; telling it;
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic;
Translating from one language into another;
All of mentioned usage of words and languages are placed in their proper language games. Moreover, each language game has its own rules. In this sense, the routine and everyday language will become important and language will not be only a row and line of words and signs. The real language is related to the collection of actions and reactions and is counted as a part of our lifestyle and form. Different language games are rooted from forms of life. In other words, each particular form of life is related to its language that is different from other language of forms of life.

Language is an inseparable part of human acts that can be defined in clear frame of life and culture. Language is a social act; it is not a limited essence which we can reach to it only by mental and subjective pure argument. In this regard, the word can find its meaning only among the context which is used, and because of differentiate in the context; there are many different language games. In this regard we only have to see to the different language games how show itself to us and then describe what is being. (Mahdavi Nejad 2005) He indicates:


However, in his view, the duty of a philosopher is to put language in its correct context. Its duty is clearing the rules and meta-rules and guidelines that solve the ambiguities and problems of using the language. As Malcolm describes the vantage point of Wittgenstein:

This ‘putting before us’ the use of a word includes comparing and contrasting its use with the use of other words. (Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View 1993).

Then Malcolm gives an example about the words ‘reason’ and ‘cause’ that have some similarities and differences; then he says: “the noting of these differences may take us by surprise.” (Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View 1993) But he explains that language games are not like grammar.

Here the term “language game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 1973).

And because of that he adds in On Certainty:

You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable. It is there-like our life. (Wittgenstein, On Certainty 1969).

Thus language phenomena have not a formal unit. In this sense Anscombe describes that:

The difference of opinion about what belongs to grammar arises from belief in and practice of a ‘formal’ science of grammar on the one hand, and a study of what a given use of words amounts to or achieves or tells us on the other. (Anscombe 1981).

But this is not the end of story; other element in the Wittgenstein’s later view is related to the terms family resemblance and private language. Let us explain these two important terms in his view.

Family Resemblance

It is, previously, mentioned that the later Wittgenstein said: “don’t ask of a meaning of a proposition, but ask about its usage.” And the usage of proposition should be understood from the linguistic and social backgrounds. If a
language has not a proper usage, thus it will be meaningless. In this regard language is not going to discover the reality and the essence of trueness and it is not regarding to a specific and definite thing. It is enough that things and phenomena are in a spectrum of similar and joint qualities and attributes to have one form of life and then one language games. Thus we can name things according to their family resemblance between their extensions and denotations. In this respect, we cannot find any reason for judging one form of life, each other. Because of that Hudson explains his view by the phrase:

One example, which he discusses at some length, is belief in a Last Judgment. If a theist says, 'I believe in a Last Judgment' and an atheist says, 'I do not', what is the nature of disagreement between them? Wittgenstein is surely correct in thinking that it is not simply a case of one predicting an empirically observable event and the other denying it. …

If Wittgenstein is correct here, does not simply means that people are not reasonable where religious belief is concerned? His answer is that, in one sense of the word, they are reasonable, but not in another. (Hudson 1968).

Wittgenstein, however, knows the best name for this kind of similarity, family resemblance and he tries to give some patterns for that. In philosophical investigations, he indicates:

I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colors of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. And I shall say: 'games' form a family. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 1973).

But in answer to the question about the criteria of this similarity, he refuses to no exact criteria. If they can be count as a family, there are many things to create this similarity which are not less. He explains:

Consider for example the proceeding that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic Games and so on. What is common to them all? Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games' " but look and see whether there is anything common to all. For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 1973).

Private Language

According to the Wittgenstein's view, the meaning is objective and thus, its existence is not related to mind or mental knowledge of people. In the contrast of classical philosophers, who believe to the implication of words to the mental concepts, in his belief, the meaning is a common issue; not subjective and mental. In this regard there is not any private language. Sentences and propositions, in fact, are used for expressing the feelings and emotions. Anscombe quotes a story about this form of life:

I once had the following dialogue with a four-year-old who had a piece of paper in her hand:
I: Give me that.
C: Whose is it? (Hands it over)
I: How many words did I say?
C: When?
I: When I asked you to give it to me.
C: One.
I: What was that one word?
C: "Can I have paper, please."
Explaining the Distinction between Religion and Science in His View

In this respect, bring the reader's mind, as a conclusion, to the theory of language games. There is variety of games in different languages. Each language of science, religion, philosophy, art and etc. has its especial game. The language of science has employed for describing the empirical phenomena; the language of art is used for stimulating the emotions and feelings; the language of religion is for spiritual guidance of human; this is on one hand. And on the other hand, each language game has own laws and principles which are different from others.

In this sense, religion and the religious action has its own language game and form of life. We should see on it in its context and background; and because of that religious language has its specific logic and it is wrong using the scientific and positivistic context, background and language in that. Religion is a form of life which is completely, distinguished and in contrast with, from the scientific form of life. Each of them has its own laws and each of them is understood in its context and background.

Thus the scientific form of life is required the scientific language game and the religious form of life is required the religious language game. For understanding each of them it is necessary to understand its proper form of life; or it is better to say that for understanding each of them, we should enter its world; for finding the religious language we should be a religious man and should see to God, cosmos and human with their eyes, until have a true judgment for religious teachings. For recognizing all language game, we ought to play in that game as a player not as a bystander.

It is possible, in the first seeing, to find some common and similar words in both languages of science and religion and because of that it is possible to be in conflict – or in support-, some scientific propositions with religious propositions; but these propositions find incomparable meanings in each context of their different usages. Thus their relationship is only an illusion. Malcolm gives an example and explains the situation:

The function of the words, ’it is God's will’, when said religiously and seriously, in a time of trouble, is not to offer the final explanation, nor any explanation at all. Instead, they are an attempt to bring to an end the torment of asking 'why did it have to happen?' an attempt to give the tormented one rest, to provide peace.

In secular life, when something distressing occurs and there is a demand for explanations for why it happened – at some stage someone may say: ’it is pointless to continue seeking for an explanation. We are faced with a fact which we must accept. That's how it is!’ the words ’it is God's will’, have many religious connotations: but they also have logical force similar to 'That is how it is!' Both expressions tell us to stop asking ‘why?’ and instead to accept a fact!(Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View 1993).

This is the reason that Wittgenstein says

It might be asked: how did human beings ever come to making verbal utterances which we call reports of past wishes or past intentions...Look on the language game as what is primary! (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 1973).
And in another place he answers

You make a study of a particular language-game. Then you can say to someone: 'Look at it! That's how it is! Don't ask why, but take it as a fact, without explanation!' We need 'to accept the everyday language game' (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 1973).

In this regard, on one hand, the form of consideration of religion to the cosmos is different from science, even in the common issue. In his view, it is not true to say: science proves that miracle is impossible, thus believing to the religious teachings is similar with using religious concepts and also having the feelings and emotions which are necessary for them. This is because the instrument of religious belief is not contained in the words, prediction and hypothesis. It is a kind of commitment frenzy and enthusiastic to the system of reference. He indicates:

A miracle is, as it were, a gesture which God makes. As a man sits quietly and then makes an impressive gesture, God lets the world run on smoothly and then accompanies the word of a saint by symbolic occurrence, a gesture of nature. I would be an instance if, when a saint has spoken, the trees around him bowed, as if in reverence. – Now, do I believe that this happens? I don’t.

The only way for me to believe in a miracle in this sense would be to be impressed by an occurrence in this particular way (Wittgenstein, The Wittgenstein Reader 1994).

On the other hand, somehow, there is a combination between pure religious belief and superstition. The defenders of religion who have mistaken the religious belief with the scientific hypothesis and try to make some proofs for religious claims, they don’t distinguish, clearly, religious beliefs from superstitions. The wrong way which they have passed is that they use the criteria which are used for justifying the empirical finding, exactly for justifying the religious beliefs. But, finally, his assertion on the religious actions without any logical and philosophical proofs and arguments, led him to the Wittgensteinian fideism. See (Mahdavi Nejad 2005). In his view, ‘Wisdom is cold and that extent stupid. (Faith on the other hand is a passion.) (Wittgenstein, The Wittgenstein Reader 1994).

Briefly, the basic element of Wittgensteinian fideism is that: in a religious form of life, there is not any place for theories, hypothesis and even religious rational roots; the only thing which has the importance is religions actions. In the sense of his view, Christianity –and also any other religions, is not a doctrine:

Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of something that actually takes place in human life. (Wittgenstein, The Wittgenstein Reader 1994).

Finally, in his view, we can reform our life’s form and style with assertion on the religious faith in the way of religious actions. We should come back and change our way of life. These are the actions and deed in the context of religion which, in fact, fix our religious concepts. The concept of God for a theist makes his meaning of life and its effect shall be shown in his religious deeds; while in the contrast, this concept for an atheist is not only a meaningless concept.

The fundamental point in his fideism is that there is only one language for religion and understanding and examining it only can be happen by the criteria of a unit and independent religious language.
Critical points

One of the fundamental elements of Wittgenstein's philosophy is the concept of forms of life. He mentions this concept in the book philosophical investigation in five times. But the problem is that there is an ambiguity in this concept even in his writings. In this sense Michael Martin in the book Atheism; A Philosophical Justification and Kai Nielson in the article Wittgensteinian Fideism indicate to this point. Furthermore, there are many explanations from the commentators of Wittgenstein that show this ambiguity. Thereby, the question remains that what is the exact meaning of this element of his philosophy. (Mahdavi Nejad 2005).

According to the last critique, the question arises when this problem transmits to the concept of language game, because these two elements are completely related to each other. The foundation of both refers to the social quality of human life. But there is not any criterion to bounding each society from other. For example, in the first step, we can divide easily, religious form of life from scientific form of life – or religious language game from scientific language game; but when we go throw deeply, is religion a united form of life or in that form of life, also there are other language games? If no! So why and with which criterion, is divided religion from others? And if Yes! So what are the boundaries in the religions? Are those divided to the monotheistic religions from polytheistic? Or Abrahamic from others?

Also in each religion itself, we see many forms of life in different denominations that sometimes forces us to believe in differentiate between those as different forms of life.

In this regard, as a hypothesis, we can divide religious language game from scientific –and also other- language games. But this is not the end of the story. The religion itself can be divided to the monotheistic language games and polytheistic language games. Also if we see in the – for instance- monotheistic, we find the division of Abrahamic and non-Abrahamic religions which all of them have own language games and forms of life. In continue, for example- in the Abrahamic religion, we can find Islamic form of life, Christian form of life, Jewish form of life and etc. But yet, -as a sample- in Christianity, there are different forms of life and language games like Catholic form of life, Orthodox and Protestant language game. Also in Islam and other religions there is this differentiate form of life. Nonetheless, in the Catholic there are many divisions which lead to make other forms of life, because of different cultures and societies in this denomination. And it is possible to continue the process intolerable end which can guide us to individuals and persons.

If Wittgenstein accepts that it will reach to persons, this is breaking his law that the different societies cause different forms of life and language games. And if he doesn't accept this extremity, thus he should give a criterion for the stop point and he should specify clearly and obviously, the limitations and boundaries of each form of life and language game.

If we accept the concept of language games and forms of life, that Wittgenstein asserts on the differentiate between different form, and he, also, asserts that we cannot understand each proposition of one language game in another language game, on one hand, but on the other hand, we know there are many similarities and connections between different societies and – in his view- different form of life. But he says that we cannot understand and interpret each proposition of one form of life, in the context of other form of life – the examples have mentioned in last part.

Despite of this view, we see there are many links between different societies with cause the communication of people in different cultures and form of life. This relationship between them is to the extent that makes possibility of living with each other. If they couldn't understand each other, so how they can live with each other, even as a couple? Like a religious wife and scientist husband?
In his view, it is impossible critique of religious beliefs with logical and philosophical proofs on one hand, and also on the other hand, trying to convince others with these proofs for believing in the religion is a vain and unfruitful attempt— which led to the Wittgensteinian fideism. But if religion is immune of logical proofs, so it shows that it is possible to be immune of each kind of critique. But we know that ability of reasonable and logical critique is an advantage for religion. If we cannot critique religion, thus what is the criterion of trueness of that religion as a form of life which has the duty of guidance of human? And what is the criterion of right religion from wrong religion?

In his view, what can give to human a form of life, it is not knowledgeable. But the problem arises when we say that all attitudes and views to the world are not argumentative; empirical and non-empirical, theistic and atheistic and etc. even the view which Wittgenstein himself, has to the world and does according to that. Thus all claims of him will be not knowledgeable and he cannot prove the points of views like form of life, language game, private language, fideism and etc. See (Sajedi 2005).

There are some views that whether Wittgenstein is idealism and also relativism or not? Some scholars like Alston see him idealist, because the necessity and required of his view refers to that, but some like Searle do not agree with Alston. But there are many evidences which support Alston's view.

Whether, in the field of epistemology, we can know him as a realist and in this regard as a fundamentalist or not? It seems that there is no any basic belief for human, in his view. But the problem is that if it is true, so on which basic knowledge is based his theories, too? In this sense, it seems that his view, guides us to a kind of epistemological idealism. See (Sajedi 2005).

CONCLUSION

According to the Wittgenstein view, language is not only an instrument for explaining the ideas, but the language is a combination of distinguished words that finds its inner coherency from a social institution's frame. We can use the words in a widespread and heterogeneous usage of different goals and because of that the duty of philosophy is not only logical analysis, but its duty is to explaining the different frames of language that he calls them language games.

Each language, related to its social function, has own game. Thus religion—like other institution—has its language with its rules of game and science also has its language. For understanding each language we have to play according to the rule of that language game. Religious language game leads to a kind of fideism by the name Wittgensteinian fideism. In this regard, we are not allowed to compare language of religion with the language of science. The occupations and duties of religion and science are different, because of that there is not any relationship between religion and science. Only if a person has religious form of life and he is challenging with religion in his life, can speak about religion. Also because the language of religion is distinguished from science, there is not any conflict between them.

As the conclusion, we can say shortly, the elements and basis of later Wittgenstein's view consist of: 1. Applied theory of meaning, 2. Differentiate in the usage of the words, 3. Lack of common form in the different usages, 4. Forms of life, 5. Language games and finally 6. Differentiate in the religion language game and scientific language game.

Thereby, it seems that his view leads to a kind of relativism and also we can count him idealist.
REFERENCES